Had India quickly reviewed its export ban policy, and opened exports earlier, it could avoid excessive grain stocks, reduced fiscal deficit, and benefited global markets, leading to a win-win situation.
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Backdrop:
Despite being one of the fastest growing large economy in the world in recent years, India has the largest mass of poor and malnourished people. India has about 17 percent of global population, but almost one third of global poor. Interestingly, India's share in global poverty (33 percent) in 2010 was higher than in 1981 (22 percent) (World Bank, 2013) , primarily because many other countries, especially China, were able to reduce their poverty much faster. One in every three malnourished children in the world is from India (HUNGaMA, 2011) .
Going by the international poverty line defined as $1.25/day per capita, India had 41.6 percent of its Further, it may be worth noting that an average Indian household still spends about 45 percent of its expenditure on food (NSSO, 2011) , while the poor spend even more, between 55-60 percent of their expenditure on food.
No wonder, therefore, food prices remain critical to Indian policy makers and any sharp increases in their levels invite major political repercussions. Political parties know it well that even spikes in onion prices had shaken the governments in power in earlier years.
Given this backdrop, it was but natural to expect a major political response to the global price shock of 2007-08, when food prices erupted, and even prices of basic staples like wheat and rice shot up by more than 50 percent within a few months. Going by India's Financial Year (FY, April-March), global wheat prices (US Hard Red Winter-2) in 2008-09 were at least 56 percent higher over 2007-08, and rice prices (Thai 25% broken) were 67 percent up compared to 2007-08 levels. This had a strong impact on Indian policy makers, more so because in FY 2006-07, India had imported about six million metric tonnes (MMT) of wheat at prices much higher than they were paying to their own farmers as minimum support prices (MSP).
Political Economy Responses to Trade Policy of Staples:
Indian policy makers were keeping a close watch on international prices of staples, especially after having imported large quantities of wheat (6MMTs) in 2006-07, may be the largest wheat import India undertook in more than two decades. Several international agencies such as FAO, IFPRI, among many others, were of the opinion that these high prices of food will stay strong for the next 10 years or so. The era of low food prices seemed to be over. This made Indian policy makers somewhat nervous, particularly because the stocks of wheat and rice with the Central pool (Food Corporation of India (FCI)) fell short of minimum buffer stock norms ( Figure-1) . At the same time, Indian prices of wheat and rice were way below the unfolding world prices, and therefore were very competitive exports.
Thus, this constellation of various factor: deficit in domestic grain stocks compared to their buffer stock norms; India having imported 6 MMT of wheat in 2006-07 after several decades; and Indian wheat and rice being competitive exports in the wake of rising global prices, seemed a perfect storm for Indian policy makers. The first reaction came in terms of restricting exports of rice and wheat.
Wheat exports were banned in February 2007, but rice exports were going on. Therefore, first, they The Government of India (GoI) realized the political fallout of its policy, especially on neighboring countries that were importing rice from India (like Bangladesh and Bhutan), and therefore, very quickly, within about three months after the ban, an export quota was opened for Bangladesh followed by small export quotas of both rice and wheat for a number of other South Asian and African countries honoring the existing commitments of exports to these countries. But there was no doubt that Indian policy maker's primary focus was to contain food inflation at home, especially of staples, with a view to protect poor. These highly restrictive export policies mostly remained in 
Political Economy Responses to Domestic Food Policy:
Having imported 6 MMT of wheat in FY 2006-07 at prices much above the MSPs India was giving to its own farmers, and realizing that global prices may stay high in the coming years, GoI took three major policy decisions to give a boost to grains production at home. Another major political response was for consumers. India already has a large network of public distribution system (PDS) to distribute subsidized food, primarily wheat and rice to consumers.
When MSPs of wheat and rice were raised and NFSM launched, and as a consequence, production and procurement increased, GoI kept issue prices of wheat and rice for consumers under PDS more or less unchanged. This was to extend protection to poor consumers. In fact, by 2011, emboldened by rising grain stocks with FCI, GoI introduced a bill in the Parliament to give the 'right to food' to much of Indian population, which was passed in 2013 as an Act. Under this National Food Security Act (NFSA,2013), 67 percent of India's population is supposed to get highly subsidized grains (basically wheat and rice), at Rs 2/kg for wheat and Rs 3/kg for rice, and Rs 1/kg for coarse cereals.
Antyodaya Households (poorest of poor) will get 35Kg/family per month, while others (Priority) Households will get 5Kg/person per month. The NFSA is still being rolled out, and by middle of 2015, only about 11 of the 36 Indian States/UTs have adopted it.
One more significant political response to the 2007-08 price crisis was expansion of employment program, called Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Program (MNREGA), which gave legal assurance for employment to job seekers for at least 100 days in a year. This was basically to protect the landless labor.
Consequences and Lessons Learnt:
What were the consequences of India's political responses to 2007-08 global price shock on global prices, especially rice and wheat, and also on India's major economic indicators such as food inflation, fiscal situation, and overall growth and poverty reduction?
As we noted earlier (in Figure-3 . This is where massive inefficiencies exist, with leakages in PDS system to the tune of more than 40 percent, and diversion of fertilizers (especially urea) to neighboring countries and for non-agri uses. These have become major challenges not only for fiscal management but also for political masters to wind them down in a calibrated fashion.
From this, at least three major lessons emerge from this India story:  India could have averted an outright ban on exports of wheat and rice, by raising MEP in a gradual manner. Even if the ban was imposed to protect the poor in India, it should have been reviewed every three months, and exports could have been opened much earlier when domestic stocks were building up. That would have avoided excessive accumulation of stocks (in relation to buffer stocking norms) at home, and also put a little downward pressure on global food prices with win-win situation, globally and locally.
 Loose fiscal policy in the garb of 'fiscal stimulus' continued for too long, and it could have been wound down much earlier. Also, if 'fiscal stimulus' had to be given, it could have been more in building infrastructure that would have given good supply response and also enhanced India's competitive strength. Fiscal stimulus largely for consumption created too much pressure on prices, including food prices, and took a heavy toll politically.
 India could use a direct income policy (direct benefit transfer (DBT)) to help its poor consumers on one hand, and small and marginal farmers on the other. This could be done by putting food and fertilizer subsidies through cash transfer route directly into the accounts of identified beneficiaries. This would reduce "leakages" in food and fertilizers dramatically, and save large resources of the GoI without compromising on the objectives of helping poor consumers and farmers. These savings can be put in as investments in agriculture (irrigation, agri-R&D, marketing infrastructure, etc), which would reduce the distortions and make Indian agriculture more productive, competitive and vibrant, reducing rural poverty much faster.
